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Introduction 
 
 
Cameroon and Boko Haram 
Time to Think beyond Terrorism and Security 
Denis M. Tull 
The terrorist organisation Boko Haram will determine Cameroon’s medium-term 
domestic and security agenda. Together with an underestimated structural propensity 
to crisis and political conflict, this presents the country with a double challenge. The 
ability of Cameroonian state and society to master both is far lower than talk about 
this “regional anchor of stability” would have it. Europe should start developing ideas 
on crisis prevention. 
 
Since 2013 the Nigeria-based Boko Haram 
militia has successively expanded its terror 
attacks and bombings into Cameroon. Until 
then Cameroon had been a safe haven where 
the authorities tolerated the group in the 
context of an unspoken mutual non-aggres-
sion pact. 
In the Sights of Boko Haram 
The escalation occurred in two stages, 
triggered by a formal declaration of war on 
Boko Haram issued by President Paul Biya 
after the regional summit on the insurgency 
in Paris in May 2014. This led to surge of 
military confrontations in northern Cam-
eroon’s regions bordering Nigeria, with 
many casualties on both sides and the 
deployment of two thousand reinforce-
ments by government forces. Boko Haram 
demonstrated its growing confidence in 
spectacular fashion in July 2014, when it 
attacked a residence of the Cameroonian 
deputy prime minister in the north of the 
country and captured his wife. French and 
Chinese citizens have also been kidnapped, 
with large ransom payments suggesting 
that the group enjoys a solid financial base. 
The conflict entered a new stage of esca-
lation in the run-up to the Nigerian presi-
dential elections of March 2015. Increasing-
ly aggressive action by the Nigerian army 
and the neighbouring states (above all Chad) 
forced Boko Haram onto the defensive. 
Since then the group has shifted its strategy 
from direct confrontation to guerrilla tac-
tics and terrorist attacks, and the number 
of attacks and suicide bombings has shot 
up in both Nigeria and Cameroon. Since 
mid-July Boko Haram has conducted at 
least three suicide attacks in the Extrême-
Nord region, with a total of forty deaths. 
And the regional capital Maroua, about 
one hundred kilometres from the Nigerian 
border, was affected for the first time. That 
attack in the heart of national territory 
SWP Comments 42 
August 2015 
2 
rang alarm bells, as incidents had hitherto 
been restricted to targets close to the border. 
Boko Haram’s growing base in Cameroon 
is equally unsettling. It is now relatively 
certain that the group is recruiting mem-
bers in Cameroon, and by no means only 
through coercion. Religious/ideological 
preferences, social affinities among the 
Kanuri (who live on all sides of the Nigeria–
Cameroon–Chad border triangle), and not 
least financial and social incentives make 
the group attractive to some. In a densely 
populated region with above-average pov-
erty, membership of Boko Haram offers 
young men opportunities that are other-
wise unattainable: income and employ-
ment, marriage, social status, etc. At the 
same time, economic problems are worsen-
ing. Given that 80 percent of all consumer 
goods in northern Cameroon are imported 
from Nigeria, border closures and other 
restrictions have negative repercussions on 
trade and livelihoods. 
The government in Yaoundé has re-
sponded to each stage of escalation by 
deploying more troops to the north. Yet the 
helpfulness of militarising northern Cam-
eroon may justifiably be questioned. Firstly, 
the effectiveness of regular military units 
is limited in the face of asymmetric threats. 
Secondly, Cameroon and Nigeria have yet 
to agree on effective cooperation. It remains 
to be seen whether Nigerian President 
Buhari’s visit to Yaoundé in July has brought 
about any change on that front. Thirdly, 
the growing number of Nigerian refugees 
in northern Cameroon is a bone of con-
tention. The Cameroonian authorities, 
fearing infiltration by Boko Haram fighters, 
have moved against the refugees. In early 
August 3,500 were deported, with another 
12,000 to follow. Finally, there is still no 
regional strategy against Boko Haram. 
The operationalisation of the 8,700-strong 
Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), 
made up of troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger (plus Benin), is proceeding 
only slowly. 
Terror Meets Fragility 
Boko Haram has without doubt become 
the central challenge for the Cameroonian 
government and the dominant domestic 
political issue. From a political and security 
perspective, Cameroon is in fact experienc-
ing an undeclared state of emergency, where 
the external shock of Boko Haram encoun-
ters a politically and socially fragile system 
that less than casual observers regard as 
susceptible to crisis and violent escalation. 
A glance at common indicators of vulner-
ability to crisis shows Cameroon occupying 
high and in some cases rising places. De-
spite its great wealth of natural resources, 
the country has been stagnating economi-
cally and socially for years. In some regions, 
including the north, poverty is increasing 
(the national poverty rate is 40 percent). 
In view of rapid population growth, mass 
unemployment and underemployment (69 
percent) are socially explosive, especially in 
the cities. The state’s legitimacy is poor, as 
is the effectiveness of its institutions. Cor-
ruption and a glaring lack of the rule of law 
characterise almost the entire public sector. 
This contrasts with the enduring resilience 
of a regime that stays in power by repress-
ing, intimidating and coopting its oppo-
nents, but manages to preserve an appear-
ance of political stability. But violent pro-
tests across the country in 2008, triggered 
by a cut in fuel subsidies and a constitu-
tional amendment lifting the restrictions 
on President Biya’s term of office, high-
lighted the vulnerability of the leadership 
in Yaoundé. More than one hundred people 
were killed by the forces of law and order 
and the elite Bataillon d’Intervention 
rapide (BIR). 
Structural factors aside, the current po-
litical constellation increases the potential 
for crisis. It is absolutely unclear who will 
succeed President Biya (age eighty-two), 
who has ruled the country since 1982, and 
will leave the political stage sooner or later. 
Although the constitution theoretically 
offers a route for succession, it is far from 
certain if this institutional mechanism will 
be respected. With Biya showing no signs of 
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resigning and public discussion of the ques-
tion a political taboo, the air of uncertainty 
can trigger conflicts at any time – whether 
between rival wings within the regime fight-
ing over Biya’s succession or from the oppo-
sition and civil society, which regard the 
president’s departure as an opportunity for 
change. 
“Known Unknowns” 
Boko Haram thus impacts upon an already 
fragile context in Cameroon, where it could 
have direct and indirect negative effects. 
A key question is what the consequences 
of the conflict with Boko Haram will be for 
the cohesion of Cameroon’s heterogeneous 
society, which has for years tended to be 
more drifting apart than coming together. 
To be sure, a wave of patriotism in response 
to the threat of Boko Haram can currently 
be observed gripping parts of the popula-
tion. One symbol of this atmosphere is a 
grassroots fundraising campaign for the 
troops. These and other actions such as 
solidarity marches represent an attempt to 
present a nation united against the enemy. 
But they also betray justified fears of frac-
tures in society that could deepen along 
regional or religious lines. Instrumentalisa-
tion of social identities is a common tool 
of political and social conflict in Cameroon. 
For example, local politicians of the ruling 
party from the central region have accused 
their colleagues from the north of support-
ing Boko Haram and seeking to destabilise 
the government. Even if that discussion has 
faded for the moment, growing stigmatisa-
tion of the politically and demographically 
important north can by no means be ex-
cluded if the threat worsens. And that could 
unsettle a regime built on ethno-regional 
architecture. 
A second risk emanates from conceivable 
developments within the security forces. The 
relationship between the coexisting appa-
ratuses (the regular army and two separate 
elite units, BIR and the Presidential Guard) 
is not free of tensions. The pressure placed 
on the troops by Boko Haram could exacer-
bate existing problems. Among the security 
forces there are also indications of unrest 
over corruption and the lack of opportuni-
ties for promotion, and frustration at the 
ineffectiveness of the strategy against Boko 
Haram. Since 2014 the government has fast-
tracked recruitment and training for more 
than six thousand new soldiers. In an army 
that values its professionalism, this ap-
proach has met with criticism. As a result 
of the above, a question mark must be 
placed over the cohesion of the armed 
forces – all the more so in the event that 
the government were to lose its grip and 
the threat from Boko Haram grow still 
larger. Open conflicts within the security 
apparatus, or even a military coup, would 
no longer be inconceivable. 
The internal consequences of counter-
terrorism present a third potential prob-
lem. An eye must be kept on the applica-
tion of the anti-terrorism law, which passed 
parliament with only the votes of the gov-
erning party in December 2014. Human 
rights groups, opposition parties and civil 
society actors have denounced the law as a 
tool for curtailing civil and political rights. 
They criticise the broad definitions of ter-
rorist acts (“disrupt the normal functioning 
of public services, the delivery of essential 
services to the public or create a crisis 
situation among the public”), which could 
be used to silence opponents of the regime. 
In view of the already limited freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly and 
the repressive practices of the administra-
tive and security apparatus, these are fears 
to take seriously. 
It is predictable that the reform-resistant 
government will use the terrorist threat to 
distract – at home and abroad – from the 
country’s structural problems and continue 
to postpone decisions on fundamental 
reforms that are long overdue. 
Conclusion 
Great as the Boko Haram threat to Cam-
eroon is, equally large is the danger of a 
sole focus on terrorism obscuring the struc-
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tural and political problems facing the 
country. As outlined above, the two chal-
lenges should not be considered in isolation 
from one another, because Boko Haram 
has the potential to drive an escalation of 
existing internal conflicts. 
A proactive European foreign policy 
should firstly aim to prevent or minimise 
the outlined potential negative conse-
quences of both Boko Haram itself and of 
the fight against it. Secondly, a strategic 
approach should be developed to ensure a 
peaceful and orderly short- and medium-
term post-Biya transition that – in the ideal 
case – would open up opportunities for 
institutional political reform. It is likely 
that such a negotiated transition would 
amount to a pact between regime insiders. 
Contacts to the relatively unknown Cam-
eroonian power elites would have to be 
intensified, in order to identify relevant 
actors. A second objective should be to 
break the taboo on the question of Biya’s 
succession. That would mean creating 
transparency in the sense of public dis-
cussions not only about the transition, but 
also about the challenges and institutional 
reforms Cameroon will face after Biya. A 
peaceful transition would be a success, 
a transition entirely without institutional 
reforms a tragic missed opportunity. 
Even if EU member states were able to 
agree on a joint approach, Europe’s influ-
ence must be regarded realistically. France 
probably carries the greatest weight with 
Cameroonian officials, but Paris also finds 
itself confronted with considerable resent-
ments, inside and outside of the regime. For 
that reason, an active and visible French role 
is actually excluded. Not so with the United 
Kingdom and Germany, which are not met 
with the same mistrust – or in the case 
of Germany enjoy a high standing. The fact 
that Cameroon is not the focus of inter-
national rivalry is a positive factor for Euro-
pean engagement – which would naturally 
have to rely on other like-minded partners 
among the international community. 
The diversity of problems demands a co-
herent multi-dimensional approach, ideally 
orientated on a medium-term (for example 
five-year) strategy to be developed by the 
EU member states and delegations. A regu-
lar review of implementation by the Africa 
Working Group (COAFR) would be neces-
sary, in order for policies and programmes 
to work towards shared targets and not just 
more of the same. 
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